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SUMMARY
Government interference in markets arouses heated emotions on both sides of the political
spectrum. But the fact remains that governments of all stripes routinely play a direct role in
the economy. Motivations run the gamut from the economic (correcting perceived market
failures) to the ethical (addressing social injustice) to the nakedly political (ideology or the
status quo demands it). This paper offers a highly readable theoretical and practical
framework for understanding federal and provincial governments’ market interventions in
sectors including power generation, alcohol and mail delivery. Public ownership can advance
a range of normative objectives, so the choices, reasons and outcomes for the government,
the Canadian economy, Crown corporation employees and the general public can vary as
widely as the enterprises involved. But in asking why and how and assessing ways and means,
the authors bring together a substantial body of knowledge and expertise, providing an
essential guide to a phenomenon that, like it or not, will remain a major part of Canada’s
economic landscape for a long time to come.  
* The authors are grateful to Julia Potter for her invaluable research assistance. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Why and how a government decides to intervene in a market are important questions given the
impact these decisions have on economic efficiency and social welfare. In this paper, we discuss
the reasons why a government would intervene, and, if so, why it would choose one instrument
over another. We focus in particular on the role of state-owned enterprises (Crown corporations),
though one cannot appreciate the case for such an instrument of state influence without
considering the alternatives.
The main objective of this paper is to offer a framework for evaluating the policy advantages
and disadvantages of Crown corporations. Because of the broad sweep of considerations and
approaches that might influence thinking on public ownership, general conclusions about
whether public ownership or privatization is appropriate are not available. It will often depend
on the normative values that one seeks to promote, and in all cases will depend on the particular
context. As we discuss, however, political, rather than normative, influences can interfere with
the choice to privatize or nationalize an industry, and a deeper understanding of what normative
arguments support or discourage the existence of Crown corporations may be helpful in
exposing the weakness of certain politically motivated positions on the question.
Section II sets out the major rationales for intervention: for efficiency, ethical, or political
reasons. Section III addresses the different types of instruments available to a government and
the theoretical benefits and drawbacks of each: tighter control through ownership in its various
forms, or less influence through regulation of the private sector. Section IV focuses on Crown
corporations in Canada and compares governmental ownership with different approaches in
various jurisdictions. Lastly, Section V describes proposals for reform, including discussion of
why privatization of Crown corporations is often socially desirable but political considerations
prevent it.
II. RATIONALES FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY
A: Efficiency Rationales
Efficiency is achieved in markets with perfect competition, no externalities, no public goods,
and perfect information. Here, competition among suppliers drives the market price to marginal
cost. For such markets, there is no need for government intervention (beyond protecting
property rights and enforcing contracts). However, as Greenwald and Stiglitz discuss, no
existing market meets all of these criteria perfectly and thus none is perfectly efficient.1 Perhaps
reflecting this reality, government involvement occurs in nearly every industry, but to different
degrees since markets diverge from ideal conditions in different ways and degrees. Of course,
government intervention is itself rarely formulated and implemented perfectly either, implying
that most policy choices are made in a second-best world. For example, government actors may
be prone to the same kinds of bounded rationality that plague private choices, which might
make one sceptical about the wisdom of government intervention on paternalism grounds. But
there are a variety of market failures that government intervention could conceivably, even if
1 Bruce Greenwald & Joseph Stiglitz, “Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets,”
(1986) 101:2 Quarterly Journal of Economics 229. 
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not always in practice, address in socially beneficial ways. Natural monopolies, markets with
externalities, markets for public goods, and markets with imperfect information may all justify
government involvement on efficiency grounds. Each of these economic rationales for
intervention will be briefly sketched below.
1. NATURAL MONOPOLY
A monopoly is characterized by a single enterprise having a sufficient market share to the point
where it has the power to reduce output and increase the market price of the good or service
provided. Monopolies can arise through mergers and increases in market share, or naturally. A
natural monopoly exists where economies of scale are such that average costs fall with each
additional unit produced. In such industries, the market will tend to result in a single producer
since a larger producer always has a cost advantage over a smaller producer. Examples of such
industries are electricity transmission and distribution and urban or municipal water supply,
which require a large investment in capital equipment to set up methods of delivery to
consumers and it is inefficient for competing firms to make duplicate investments. Natural
monopolists, operating in a profit-maximizing capacity, will restrict output and raise prices
above marginal cost. Government therefore may have a role in restricting this socially
undesirable outcome through regulation or public ownership. 
2. EXTERNALITIES
Externalities — spillover effects that affect third parties — are frequently relied on to justify
government involvement in markets. Externalities are either benefits or costs that are realized
by parties outside a particular exchange. Positive externalities may need to be encouraged by
the government because in a laissez-faire free market they are likely to be under-produced.
Self-interested actors are not willing to pay for benefits that others will receive. An example of
a positive externality is having children inoculated, protecting both the specific child as well as
broader society against infection. Another important example is intellectual property. Ideas
which are essential to technological innovation and economic growth are often widely
accessible. Innovations by one firm can be used by competing firms, and this may reduce
incentives for enterprises to spend resources on developing innovations. To preserve these
incentives, the government protects ideas through intellectual property right laws so that the
inventor can profit from the idea before it spreads through the economy. On the other hand,
negative externalities need to be restricted in a laissez-faire economy. In this case, they are
overproduced because their cost is not fully borne by the person that creates them. A common
example is air or water pollution. 
Ronald Coase showed that, where transaction costs do not exist, government involvement is
not required in cases of externalities because bargaining between self-interested actors can
result in an efficient outcome even in the presence of externalities.2 However, as Coase also
stressed, the conditions under which this theorem holds, especially very low transaction costs,
may often not exist. Therefore government intervention is often needed to promote or
discourage positive and negative externalities by creating schemes for internalization of the
externalities. 
2 Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1 [Coase].
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33. PUBLIC GOODS
A public good is one that is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable; it is a good that may be
consumed simultaneously by people who cannot be excluded from enjoying such consumption.
Public goods invite a free rider problem in which individuals will seek to take advantage of the
benefits of having the good without the disadvantage of paying for it. As a result, there will be
a tendency for the good to be underprovided.3 An example is the protection provided by the
armed forces or police or fire services. Such protection cannot be offered only to certain
individuals who have paid for it. Therefore the government has an important role in ensuring
that these essential services are provided. 
4. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
Another cause of market failure is information asymmetries. The government may have a role
in protecting the consumer through the reduction of these information asymmetries. Experience
goods are those for which the quality cannot be determined until after purchase and use. In this
case, a buyer has less information than the seller about the quality of the good, which leads to
distortions in the market resulting in lower-quality goods being sold and fewer exchanges
overall than if there were perfect information.4 Akerlof famously used the used automobile
industry to illustrate these distortions.5 If quality is indistinguishable to the buyer at the time of
purchase, then this quality level may be estimated based on the average quality of cars for sale
in the market. But then sellers of above-average cars are reluctant to sell and may drop out of
the market. The result of such information asymmetry is a crowding out of high-quality cars
and fewer cars being exchanged. 
The market may be able to correct market asymmetries to some extent through the spread of
reputational information and the development of brand names, chains (such as restaurant
chains), and warranties which signal to the consumers a particular quality of good. However,
such mechanisms will typically only resolve informational deficiencies imperfectly, and there
will be a tendency for the lemons problem to lead to underprovision of certain goods.  These
information problems may invite government intervention. The government can also intervene
with licensing requirements or regulating or imposing warranties and guarantees for goods.6
Credence goods are similar to experience goods but have qualities that cannot be discerned
even after purchase or use. One example is pharmaceutical products and their safety and
effectiveness. Private entities providing such goods would have an incentive to shirk on
quality, as it cannot be detected before and after use.7 Therefore there may be a role for
government intervention to certify products and services and test them for safety and
effectiveness. 
3 Michael J Trebilcock & Edward M Iacobucci, “Privatization and Accountability,” (2003) 116:5 Harvard Law Review
1422.
4 Ibid.
5 George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” (1970) 84:3 The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 488 [Akerlof]. 
6 Ibid.
7 Supra note 3
There may also be circumstances in which government intervention is helpful in overcoming
problems with insurance markets resulting from asymmetric information. Insurance can result
in adverse selection; customers who are most risky are most likely to purchase insurance, thus
driving up the price of insurance, which can result in the unravelling of such markets as better
risks choose not to buy insurance. Government provision of insurance, such as with public
health insurance, can avoid this problem by compelling all citizens in effect to buy insurance.
Government regulation can also mitigate adverse selection, as with automotive insurance
markets where provinces require all drivers to buy insurance (perhaps from a monopolistic
state insurance provider, as in the case of British Columbia).
B. Ethical Rationales
In addition to efficiency explanations for government involvement, governments may have
other justifications for intervening in markets including distributive justice, communitarianism,
corrective justice, and paternalism. 
1. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
The government may have objectives beyond making markets operate efficiently. While a
market may deliver an efficient outcome, this outcome may result in a substantially unequal
distribution of wealth. Utilitarianism advocates that resources should be distributed to
maximize the aggregate utility, welfare, or happiness of members of a society.8 Government
involvement, according to this perspective, may increase utility of the worse off more than it
decreases the utility of the better off and so even when outcomes are efficient, redistribution
still increases society’s overall utility. Those who are better off may also be empathetic to the
suffering of others and thus may be willing to support redistribution policies increasing their
overall utility even as their material resources are reduced.9
The Rawlsian perspective focuses instead on the liberty principle and the difference principle.
The liberty principle prescribes that each person should “have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”10 The difference principle,
on the other hand, states that distributive policies should benefit the most disadvantaged in
society.11 If there is a priority in society for equality, then the government can use redistributive
policies to improve it. Involvement may go beyond taxes and transfers to include more direct
forms of interventions. 
8 Edward M Iacobucci, Michael J Trebilcock & Huma Haider, Economic Shocks: Defining a Role for Government
(Toronto: CD Howe Institute, 2001) at 43 [Economic Shocks]; Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
Welfare (Harvard University Press, 2002).
9 Ibid at 44. 
10 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971) 
11 Ibid.
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2. COMMUNITARIANISM
Communitarianism asserts that each member of society has social responsibilities and duties to
enhance the good of society based on an idea of communal ethics.12 This includes the
assurance of equality and economic security for all members of society. While distributive
justice theorists and communitarians both support equality, their underlying values may be
quite different. Communitarians argue not simply for equality and economic security for their
own sakes, but because it is important for social solidarity.13 Distributive justice allows for self-
interested behaviour and a corrective strategy to redistribute resources, but communitarianism
sees self-interested pursuits as selfish and detracting from the strength of the community.
Therefore government involvement is necessary to protect these communal interests, for
example through the universal provision of basic services such as health and education. The
universality aspect is important since it includes the wealthy as well, whereas distributive
justice only protects the worst off in the community.14 The regulation of programming in the
broadcasting sector by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission
(CRTC) is an example of government regulation for communitarian reasons. The CRTC
ensures that broadcasting in Canada exhibits Canadian creativity and talent, bilingualism,
multicultural diversity, and the unique role of aboriginals in Canada.15 The mandate of the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) reflects a similar rationale. 
3. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
Corrective justice is another non-economic rationale for government to intervene in markets.
The government can ensure compensation for parties through the civil justice system for the
torts of negligence or nuisance in order to correct wrongs that have been committed. In this
way, the party that has suffered receives the value of what was taken. Private law ensures
reimbursement between two private parties that does not involve the government and for public
negligence when the government compensates a party that has suffered a wrong as a result of
government action.16
Another area in which corrective justice occurs is in takings of property from individuals by
the government, which requires compensation in order to restore the equality between the
property owner and the government.17
4. PATERNALISM
The government may also wish to place limitations on the autonomy of individuals in society
to reduce potentially self-destructive consequences of their otherwise voluntary choices.
Certain categories of people have widely been deemed to require protection, such as minors
and the mentally disabled. In addition, the government may wish to influence individual
behaviour on a broader scale. 
12 Richard S Gilbert, How Much Do We Deserve? (Landam: University Press of America, 1991). 
13 Albert Weale, “Equality, Social Solidarity, and the Welfare State,” (1990) 100:3 University of Chicago Press 473. 
14 Economic Shocks, supra note 8 at 54. 
15 Lawson AW Hunter, Edward M Iacobucci & Michael J Trebilcock, “Scrambled Signals: Canadian Content Policies in
a World of Technological Abundance,” (2010) 301 CD Howe Institute Commentary 1. 
16 Economic Shocks, supra note 8 at 50.
17 Ibid at 51.
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Individuals sometimes make unfavourable choices due to coercion or information failures. If a
decision is coerced through duress, subtle manipulation, pressure from unequal bargaining
powers, etc., then the government may wish to adopt laws that nullify decisions made based on
those factors.18 Information failures, such as ignorance of factual circumstances or
consequences and temporarily distorting states such as intoxication, can also result in
inconsistent choices, which the government may want to intervene to prevent.19
The government may also want to curb bad or self-destructive behaviours such as narcotics use
or not wearing helmets while riding a motorcycle.20 Laws that regulate such behaviours
infringe upon the liberty of individuals in order to protect those individuals. 
Paternalism can be hard or soft. Hard paternalism occurs when the government bans outright
an activity. Soft paternalism instead leaves a choice for the individual but seeks to guide that
choice to the socially optimal one. For example, using an opt-out structure for pension schemes
has greatly increased the enrolment rate in pension plans. With an opt-in scheme, individuals
who have yet to decide whether a pension plan is optimal for their situation may not take the
steps to enrol themselves as a result of inertia or myopia. This can be altered by making the
default setting enrolment, so that while the freedom to opt-out exists, many will not use it.21
The boundaries of the proper scope for paternalism by government are vigorously contested.
Opponents of paternalism, such as John Stuart Mill, argue that those who are capable of
making voluntary decisions should have that opportunity without government influence so long
as they are not harming others.22
C. Political Rationales
1. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
While the previous rationales have all identified normative reasons for possible government
intervention in economic activities, public choice theory is a positive analysis of government
involvement which seeks to explain why governments may decide to intervene in markets
because of the self-interested behaviour of governmental and private actors, notwithstanding
the absence of a compelling normative rationale. Like private actors, politicians are assumed to
be self-interested. They need to continue to attract the support of their electorate in order to
remain in power, which requires resources, including both organizational and financial
support.23 Private interest groups can use this desire of governmental actors to promote their
own agendas. The most effective interest groups are likely to be those that have large stakes,
significant resources, and strong organizations. These groups can provide the politician with
the resources needed to attain or retain political office, either through votes or financial
support.24 Therefore an exchange relationship is created; politicians achieve political office
18 Michael J Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) at 152.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid at 160-161.
21 Richard H Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
22 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: John W Parker and Son, 1859).
23 Steven Croley, Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008) ch. 1.
24 Ibid ch 2 at 18.
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through furthering the objectives of powerful interest groups. This is not a system that can be
easily exploited by broad or diffuse groups, which are less able to lobby for their own interests
because of information and collective action problems.25 Unlike in economic markets, citizens
cannot easily express their distaste for particular actions or outcomes but instead have only an
all-or-nothing decision through their vote. These opportunities to elect politicians are infrequent
and often are not tailored to express concerns over specific issues. It is often unclear what the
political candidate’s position is on regulatory issues and many policies are being evaluated in
one vote. Therefore interest groups that are more concentrated and able to pursue their narrowly
focused objectives are favoured over the larger public interest, even if the losses to broader
interests are greater than the benefits received by concentrated interest groups. Thus instead of
attaining social objectives, which benefit the public at large, this process works to the detriment
of overall society. In this way, the government’s involvement may in fact exacerbate the market
failures or fairness concerns described above rather than alleviate them.26
2. PATH DEPENDENCY
Once governments are involved in a market or industry, there is a powerful tendency to persist
on the same course. This is known as path dependency. Political concerns can explain this
reluctance to change the status quo. One fundamental feature of politics is the positive feedback
mechanism in which expectations adapt over time.27 As a result, organizations have a strong
tendency to persist once they are institutionalized. North argues that this reinforcement is due to
the increasing returns that are prevalent in the political context.28 Adaptive expectations, learning
effects, network effects, and high start-up costs all increase stakes in preserving existing
institutional arrangements rather than switching to new forms.29 Path-dependence is not all-
powerful, however, as the general trend in Canada in favour of privatization suggests. Changes
in thinking, and/or changes in economic conditions, and especially events like fiscal crises, may
have significant effects on policy despite path-dependence.
3. GOVERNMENTAL REVENUE CONSIDERATIONS
Another major factor influencing governments in deciding whether to privatize Crown
corporations is the tax treatment of the privatized entity. While the tax issues are complex, a
major issue will be the impact on government revenues post-privatization. For example, most
provincial Crown corporations in Canada are exempt from most taxes. Following privatization,
former provincial Crown corporations will have to pay both federal and provincial corporate
income taxes, in effect compelling provincial governments to share revenues with another level
of government that formerly accrued to them alone. This is likely, in many contexts, to affect
the privatization calculus.30
25 Ibid at 20. 
26 Ibid ch 1 at 9.
27 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” (2000) 94:2 The American Political
Science Review 251 at 251. 
28 Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990).
29 Mariana M Prado & Michael J Trebilcock, “Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional
Reform,” (2009) 59:3 University of Toronto Law Journal 341.
30 Jack Mintz, Duanjie Chen & Evangelia Zorotheos, “Taxing Issues with Privatization: A Checklist,” (2000) The World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2348.
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III. INSTRUMENTS OF INTERVENTION
Once a government has decided to intervene in a market for any of the reasons described
above, the method of intervention or choice of instrument is the next consideration. A
government may choose a particular instrument ranging from the most extensive form of
control by government departments to highly targeted intervention in private market activity.
We discuss each of these instruments and address key factors influencing a government’s
decision to choose public ownership or a private sector alternative. 
A. Publicly Owned Enterprises
The Financial Administration Act (FAA) outlines the legal framework for the financial
administration of Canada’s government and the accountability of publicly owned organizations.
Budget approval requirements are imposed pursuant to this Act.31 Different schedules of the
Act list types of publicly owned organizations, classified as departmental bureaucracies,
statutory and other agencies, departmental corporations, and Crown corporations. The entities
listed under each schedule are subject to different ways in which government spending may be
approved, expenditures made, revenues obtained, and funds borrowed.32 We review each type
of organization in turn.
1. DEPARTMENTAL BUREAUCRACIES
Government departments are created by Acts of Parliament and deliver programs and policies
of the government. They exercise extensive control over a wide range of policy concerns such
as defence, foreign affairs, and health.33 They differ by size, organizational structure and
geographical dispersion depending on the nature and breadth of their roles. There are two types
of departments. Central agencies such as the Treasury Board and Public Service Commission
provide common services and oversight of line departments; line departments deliver specific
programs in a policy field such as transportation, agriculture, and labour.34 Departments are
listed under Schedule I of the FAA.35
There are also special operating agencies within some departments which are established to
provide specific services or particular operational functions, and while many operate
commercially, profit generation is not required.36 Managers and staff of the agency have public
31 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, The Financial Administration Act: Responding to Non-compliance – Meeting
the expectations of Canadians, (Ottawa: TBS, 2005) at 5, online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/rev-exa/faa-
lgfp/faa-lgfp03-eng.asp> [TBS Financial].
32 Ibid. 
33 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Annual Report to Parliament – Crown Corporations and Other Corporate
Interests of Canada 2010, ch 1 (Ottawa: TBS, 2010) at 4, online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/reports-rapports/cc-
se/2010/cc-se-eng.pdf> [TBS Annual].
34 Alex Smith, “The Roles and Responsibilities of Central Agencies,” (2009), Library of Parliament at 1, online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0901-e.htm>.
35 TBS Annual, supra note 33 at 3. 
36 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Becoming a Special Operating Agency, (Ottawa: TBS, 1998) at 7, online:
<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/opepubs/tb_b4/bsoa-doss1-eng.asp#note2> [TBS SOA].
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service employment status and are required to operate within public service legislation such as
the Public Service Employment Act and the Public Service Staff Relations Act.37 Special
operating agencies are not separate legal entities and as such are not listed in the FAA.38 An
example is the Canadian Conservation Institute within the Department of Canadian Heritage.39
2. STATUTORY AND OTHER AGENCIES
Like departments, statutory and other agencies are financed through parliamentary
appropriations but they carry out specialized administrative, supervisory, advisory, regulatory,
or adjudicative functions. These organizations are listed under Schedule I.1 of the FAA.40 For
example, the Canadian Transport Agency, a quasi-independent regulatory agency, falls into this
category.41
3. DEPARTMENTAL CORPORATIONS
Departmental corporations are established by legislation and are financed through
parliamentary appropriations and sometimes user fees. They deliver services, perform research,
or regulate industries and are governed by a governing council or management board.42 The
President of the corporation reports to the Minister of the Department, and this Minister has the
ultimate responsibility for strategic policy and planning.43 These corporations are listed under
Schedule II of the FAA.44 Examples include the Canada Border Services Agency, the National
Research Council of Canada, and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.45
Departmental corporations that deliver services are called service agencies. They are set up to
execute a highly operational task or service where private sector competition is frequently
absent. Their legislation specifically defines their level of autonomy as well as organizational
arrangements and responsibilities.46 An example of a service agency is the Canada Revenue
Agency.47 
37 Ibid at 8. 
38 TBS Annual, supra note 33 at 3.
39 TBS SOA, supra note 36 at 24.
40 TBS Annual, supra note 33.
41 Canadian Transport Agency, “Role and Structure,” online: <http://www.otc-cta.gc.ca/doc.php?sid=1167&lang=eng>.
42 TBS Annual, supra note 33 at 4.
43 Canadian Food Inspection Agency, “About the CFIA”, online:
<http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/agen/agene.shtml>.
44 TBS Annual, supra note 33 at 3.
45 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, News Release, “List of Crown Corporations, Departmental Corporations, and
Shared Governance Organizations,” (17 Nov 2009) online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/reports-rapports/cc-se/2010/cc-
se-eng.pdf> [TBS List].
46 TBS Annual, supra note 33 at 5. 
47 TBS List, supra note 45.
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4. CROWN CORPORATIONS
Crown corporations are government-owned corporations that provide commercial services.
This has prompted their description as “structural heretics.”48 Their goals include commercial
as well as public policy concerns. Legislation, letters patent, or articles of incorporation under
the Canada Business Corporations Act (or provincial Business Corporations Acts) establish
Crown corporations49 and prescribe a corporation’s name, mandate, powers, and objectives.50
Unlike departmental corporations, they operate at arm's length from the government and are
governed by a board of directors.51 Government control may be exerted through the
corporation's budget and the appointment of its chairperson and directors. Crown corporations
are listed under Schedule III of the FAA.52 Schedule III is divided into two parts, the second of
which corresponds to corporations that operate in a competitive environment, do not ordinarily
depend on appropriations from the government, earn a return on equity, and generally pay
dividends. Schedule III, Part I corporations must submit annually for approval by the Governor
in Council (on the recommendation of the appropriate Minister) a corporate plan, capital
budget and operating budget, while Part II corporations do not need to submit an operating
budget, but instead a dividend proposal in the corporate plan.
The government can also only partially own a Crown corporation. In these cases, the
government owns some of the shares and the remaining shares are owned either by another
level of government (called joint enterprises) or private parties (called mixed enterprises). In
either case, the government shareholder is represented by a Minister.53
A Crown corporation can also wholly or partially own subsidiaries. The parent corporation and
other shareholders manage and receive reports from the subsidiaries. If they are wholly owned
by the government and directed to do so, they may be expected to report directly to the
Minister as though they were regular Crown corporations.54 Subsidiaries are not listed in the
FAA.
Agent Crown corporations are forms of Crown corporations that receive privileges and
immunities similar to the Crown. This special status is conferred upon the corporation by an
act of Parliament and they are listed under Part X of the FAA. Their privileges can include
federal, provincial and municipal tax exemptions.55 An example is Export Development
Canada.56 
48 J Hodgetts, The Canadian Public service 1867-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), at Ch 7.  
49 TBS Annual, supra note 33, ch 1 at 5.
50 Ibid, ch 2 at 13. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, ch 1 at 3. 
53 Ibid, ch 3 at 100.
54 Ibid, ch 1 at 5. 
55 Ibid, ch 2 at 13.
56 Ibid, ch 1 at 10.
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B. Intervention in Private Enterprise Activity
On the other end of the spectrum, government does not participate in the market/activity
directly, but rather intervenes through the use of regulation or the use of taxes and subsidies. 
Regulation can apply to prices and rate structures, supply, rate of return, disclosure of
information, methods of production, and characteristics of the quality of a good or service.57
Regulation can be administered directly by government departments or it can be delegated
either to arm’s length agencies (statutory regulatory agencies) or to the industry itself.
Direct regulation by a governmental department varies. The role and discretion of the regulator
depends on its mandate and can be limited or broad.58
Statutory regulatory agencies vary based on appointment procedures (at pleasure or fixed
terms), public participation (rights of access to information, for example), and external
relations (the scope for judicial review, the scope for executive or legislature intervention in
agency decisions, budget approvals, regular reporting responsibilities, and reviews of agency
performance). The government can tailor these agencies to perform such specific functions as
analyzing technically complex issues requiring specialized expertise or balancing competing
sets of interests.59
Self-regulation of an industry is another method of regulation. This can reduce governments’
regulatory costs for monitoring, collecting information, taking corrective action, and
enforcement. Professions are often regulated in this way in part because self-regulation can
help establish trust for activities where trust relationships are significant. Health-care
professionals are a case in point.60 Self-regulation may entail offsetting social costs because of
the self-interest of the regulators.61
An alternative to regulation is the use of taxes and subsidies to alter the behaviour of firms and
industries. Taxes are compulsory payments made to a government that are imposed by law. For
example, in 2008 British Columbia implemented a revenue-neutral carbon tax, which puts a
price on emitted tonnes of greenhouse gases to provide incentives to reduce negative
externalities from burning fossil fuels.62 
Subsidies may also be designed to influence incentives, and may be paid by government to
producers in an industry to prevent its decline or to achieve other policy goals such as raising
wages or increasing employment. A government can also use subsidies for distributional
reasons.
57 See chapter 7 on Regulation by Michael J Trebilcock et al, The Choice of Governing Instrument (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services Canada, 1982) [Trebilcock et al].
58 Ibid at 88.
59 Ibid at 89.
60 Ibid at 91.
61 Michael J Trebilcock, Carolyn J Tuohy & Alan D Wolfson, Professional Regulation: A Staff Study of Accountancy,
Architecture, Engineering and Law in Ontario Prepared for the Professional Organization Committee (Toronto:
Ministry of the Attorney General, 1979).
62 Ministry of Finance, “What is a Carbon Tax?” (29 June 2010), online: British Columbia < http://www.gov.bc.ca/>.
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C. Public Ownership versus Intervention in Private Enterprise Activity
The primary benefit of government (public) ownership is greater government control, most
importantly over policy matters, whereas the primary benefit of leaving control in the private
sector is efficiency. As we discuss, ownership and competition effects favour intervention in
private markets over public ownership, but these effects are partially offset by monitoring and
enforcement costs. These trade-offs are likely to have an impact on government’s choice of
instrument. 
1. The Ownership Effect
One reason why public ownership of a firm is usually less efficient than privately owned firms
is that it is more difficult to align the interests of management with those of the owners (the
public).63 The ideal structure for ensuring efficient operating of firms is to have the owner
operating the firm. In this situation, incentives are aligned since efficiency gains are enjoyed
directly by the owner/operator.64 Large firms expand this structure by separating multiple
owners (shareholders) from professional managers who operate the firm. As a consequence,
managers have weaker incentives to perform efficiently since the efficiency gains do not
benefit them directly.65
In the private sector, shareholders have several tools to align manager and shareholder interests
and reduce these so-called agency costs. Shareholders have the ability to monitor actions of
managers and then incentivize their better performance through the use of such commonly
available and measurable indicators of firm performance as profitability, market share, and
stock prices. These indicators can be traced over time and compared with those of competitors
as benchmarks for efficiency.66 For example, if share value is not meeting the expectations of
the shareholders, they have the power to remove directors of the corporation. Shareholders can
also use these indicators to establish manager compensation.67
In addition, the market itself gives rise to natural consequences from poor managerial
performance, namely the threat of hostile takeover or bankruptcy. If the share value falls, the
firm may be taken over by another firm seeking to manage it more efficiently, or it may go
bankrupt, which threatens the manager’s future employment, creating an incentive for the
managers to work toward maximizing share value.68
Unlike private enterprises, public agencies do not have profit maximization as their sole
objective and there is no potential for bankruptcy or hostile takeover.69 Unlike shareholders
who can modify their investment in a company based on performance, citizens pay taxes
whether or not the goods and services offered are desired or are being optimally produced. 
63 Roy Hrab, “Privatization: Experiences and Prospects,” (2003) Panel on the Role of Government at 5 [Hrab].
64 Andrew C Smith & Michael J Trebilcock, “State-Owned Enterprises in Less Developed Countries: Privatization and
Alternative Reform Strategies,” (2001) 12 European Journal of Law and Economics 217 at 220 [Smith &
Trebilcock].
65 Ibid.
66 Hrab, supra note 63. 
67 Ibid.
68 Smith & Trebilcock, supra note 64.
69 John Vickers & George Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988) at 27.
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Citizens are also far less able to monitor managerial performance due to difficulties in gaining
information on the efficiency and quality of production and in taking collective action.70
Additionally, politicians are less directly motivated to ascertain information about the quality of
service provided but may actually hide inefficiencies to reduce political costs.71
Benchmarks or indicators of performance (e.g., profit, market share, and stock value) also
cannot be easily utilized because of the influence of diverse policy goals on performance.
These work against using market outcomes to incentivize efficient managerial performance or
to offer competitive compensation to attract and retain skilled management personnel. This can
contribute to government appointments being made based on political considerations rather
than merit.72
Public sector corporations have additional misalignment challenges because of their political
nature. The self-interest of politicians may diminish their interest in incentivizing efficiency
because they can benefit from short-term decisions rather than long-term performance. For
example, some services may attract increased spending during election periods to win the
favour of voters. Public choice theory suggests that managers of government-owned enterprises
(and bureaucracies more generally) endeavour to maximize budgets, rather than efficiency, in
order to promote their own income, power and prestige.73 Changes in government can also
produce instability with respect to funding which can affect the quality and quantity of the
good or service provided and can impede long-term planning.74 This also exacerbates the
inefficiency of government firms. 
All government ownership is prone to these sources of inefficiency. Of the various kinds of
ownership discussed above, however, Crown corporations likely perform best along this
dimension. Crown corporations are subject to market pressures, including profit and capital
budget pressures, to which more internal governmental organizations are not subject.  
2. THE COMPETITION EFFECT
In the private sector, competition enhances internal efficiency as firms seek to capture a larger
market share from other competing firms, or at least avoid loss of market share or even
bankruptcy. This provides a strong incentive to minimize costs and also develop specialized
skills, expertise, and technologies.75 Competition also ensures that a large portion of the
benefits of increased efficiency is passed on to consumers. In a monopoly, the monopolist still
seeks efficiency in order to maximize profits, but allocative efficiency is attenuated due to lack
of competition and incentives to reduce output and charge supra-competitive prices. 
70 Michael J. Trebilcock, The Prospects for Reinventing Government (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1994) at 11.
71 Hrab, supra note 63 at 7.
72 Smith & Trebilcock, supra note 64.
73 William Niskanen, Bureaucracy – servant or master? Lessons from America [by] William A. Niskanen, with
commentaries by [others] (London : Institute of Economic Affairs, 1973); Trebilcock et al, supra note 63 at 13.
74 Hrab, supra note 63 at 8.
75 Ibid.
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In the public sector, the benefits of competition are reduced whether there are competitors or
not. Where publicly owned enterprises face private sector competitors, for example in
electricity generation, public firms are subject to similar competitive pressures to private firms,
but may not be as responsive to these pressures because of other policy goals and soft budget
constraints.76 They may be efficient enough to retain market share, but less efficient than their
profit-maximizing competitors. To simulate private sector firms and further increase efficiency,
a hard budget constraint can be imposed on publicly owned enterprises, introducing the threat
of bankruptcy if they do not generate sufficient revenue, but even with such a constraint
managers lack the incentive to increase efficiency over and above the point of cost recovery. It
is also possible that imposing a hard budget constraint will be infeasible or non-credible given
the public policy goals of government-owned enterprises.77
However, since many publicly owned enterprises are legislated or natural monopolies or have
no viable competitors in the private sector, they do not face the same cost-minimizing and
innovative imperatives as private sector monopolies. These inefficiencies may exacerbate the
problems associated with private sector monopolies so that the change to public ownership
may actually be more detrimental than leaving the industry in the private sector (albeit
regulated).78
3. MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT COSTS
While private sector enterprises may yield efficiency gains through the ownership and
competition effects, these gains are partially offset by governments’ monitoring and
enforcement costs to ensure that governmental policy goals are met. 
The costs of setting up and implementing these instruments of intervention in the private sector
are analogous to those of the private sector described in Ronald Coase’s theory of transaction
costs79 that private sector firms incur when they themselves outsource their operations. Coase
developed a theory of the firm to explain when firms internalize input coordination as opposed
to relying on independent contracts between entrepreneurs and input owners. He argued that
transaction costs from external transactions, such as the costs of negotiating and enforcing
contracts to coordinate production processes, help explain the existence of the firm.
Internalization can reduce contracting and monitoring costs through purchasing the right to
direct the allocation of production. On the other hand, internalizing production suppresses the
price mechanism and may lead to distortions in intra-firm processes.80
Applying the theories of Coase, governmental decision-makers face analogous transaction and
enforcement costs to those of their private sector counterparts when choosing whether to own,
or to regulate, tax, subsidize or otherwise influence the behaviour of private sector firms. For
example, if government decides to regulate private firms, then it needs to monitor and enforce
compliance because private firms may have a profit incentive to violate or circumvent the
76 Ibid at 10.
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid at 9.
79 Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” (1937) 16 Economica 386.
80 Coase, supra note 2.
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imposed regulations, a profit incentive which public entities would not share to the same
extent.81 Similarly, if government contemplates providing subsidies to a particular industry (for
example, to promote job maintenance in the industry), it must obtain and validate information
about the industry to justify current and potential future subsidies. This information may be
difficult to specify precisely. Examples of such information include: firm costs; conditions
prevailing in the firm’s output markets; the potential for the firm substituting more efficient
technology in the long run; and the likely effects of continuing subsidies on the incentives of
the owners of the firm to improve the performance of the firm. Indeed, firms, which have
superior access to relevant information, may act strategically and misstate or conceal
information to obtain larger subsidies.82 Consequently, government monitoring and
enforcement can be costly and imperfect, influencing the cost-benefit analysis of ownership
versus subsidies. The more complex a government’s policy objectives and the less static these
objectives are, the greater the challenges in regulating private firm behaviour through a stable,
predictable legal orders regime.
On the other hand, if the government chooses to provide the good in question itself, it faces the
problems associated with the suppression of market influences on managerial behaviour
discussed above. Governments may have better information than when regulating, for example,
but may choose to ignore this information in pursuit of political self-interest.
Hart, Shleifer and Visny focus on tradeoffs between quality of service and cost to explain when
a government should provide a service through ownership. According to their model, there will
usually be contractual incompleteness when a government purchases services externally.
Contracting parties cannot fully specify the quality of service, and often objectives are subject
to unforeseeable contingencies at the time of contract formation. Hypothetically, with
contractual completeness, the government could achieve the same outcome no matter the
choice of instrument. Without it, however, private contractors are able to shirk on quality in
order to cut costs without breaching their contracts, thus undermining the goals of the
government. An extreme example, illustrating the problem of contracting out to the private
sector, is the formulation and implementation of a country’s foreign or defence policy because
they serve complex objectives and are based on unforeseeable contingencies. Overall, their
model suggests that government ownership provision is advantageous when non-contractible
cost reductions have large adverse effects on quality, when quality innovations are unimportant,
and when governmental corruption in procurement is a severe problem. On the other hand, the
case for privatization is stronger when quality-reducing cost reductions can be controlled
through contract or competition, when quality innovations are important, and when patronage
and powerful unions are a severe problem inside the government. They find that in-house
provision removes the tendency to shirk on quality through extreme cost reduction but replaces
that tendency with a weaker incentive to engage in both effective cost reduction and quality
improvement.83 
81 Trebilcock et al, supra note 37 at 76.
82 Ibid.
83 Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W Vishny, “The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and Application to
Prisons,” (1997) 112:4 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1127. 
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Shleifer, in a slightly later paper, distinguishes a narrow set of circumstances in which
government ownership is likely to be superior: “1) opportunities for cost reductions that lead to
non-contractible deterioration of quality are significant; 2) innovation is relatively unimportant;
3) competition is weak and consumer choice is ineffective; and 4) reputational mechanisms are
also weak.”84
The tradeoffs between ownership and competition effects on the one hand, and monitoring and
enforcement costs on the other, provide a template for analyzing whether public or private
provision with or without regulation is socially preferable in any given circumstance. Clear
answers are not always available, but the framework provides the right kinds of questions. As a
positive matter, public choice theory explains why the rent-seeking behaviour of firms and
interest groups and the self-interested behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats can lead to a
choice of instrument that may not serve the public best in terms of economic efficiency or
social objectives. While the theories above provide reasons for government choice to own or to
regulate, subsidize, or tax an industry, they may be counteracted by self-interest and competing
motives of political and bureaucratic actors who may, as a result, choose different forms of
intervention. 
IV. DEFINING AN APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR CROWN CORPORATIONS
A. Natural Monopoly
Industries with natural monopoly features have been prime candidates for government
intervention. Historically, these industries included telecommunications, electricity (generation,
transmission, and distribution), airlines, railways, and urban and municipal distribution of
water. While many of these industries still exhibit natural monopoly properties, others no
longer do so because of technological changes (or because they never existed). 
The telecommunications industry was transformed by new technologies. However, local
telephone service continues to be regulated in a few markets given the incumbent ownership of
public switch networks and the absence of alternatives. Benefits from the move from
monopoly to competition have included lower prices, greater innovation, and greater
responsiveness to consumer needs. Further technological changes may soon alter the remaining
natural monopoly properties of the sector.85
The airline industry, also historically sometimes considered a natural monopoly, probably
incorrectly, now retains only certain elements of a natural monopoly. Airports and air
navigation systems remain regulated and retain natural monopoly properties, but air travel now
is largely governed by marketplace competition.86
While the telecommunications and airline industries are also examples of shifting market
structures that demonstrate how government intervention can vary over time, we will focus on
the electricity industry and its remaining natural monopoly elements. 
84 Andrei Shleifer, “State Versus Private Ownership,” (1998) 12:4 Journal of Economic Perspectives 133 at 140.
85 Edward Iacobucci, Michael J Trebilcock & Ralph A Winter, ”The Canadian Experience with Deregulation,” (2006)
56:1 University of Toronto Law Journal 1 at 1 [Iacobucci, Trebilcock & Winter].
86 Ibid at 3. 
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1. ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION
There are four main elements in electricity provision: generation, transmission, distribution,
and retailing. While generation historically entailed major economies of scale, suggesting a
natural monopoly, the minimum efficient scale has decreased and there no longer is (if there
ever was) a constantly decreasing average cost curve.87 Retailing is also arguably a competitive
sector so generation and retailing will not be analyzed in this paper. Electricity transmission
and distribution, however, are considered to be natural monopolies because the capital-
intensive nature of these services and scale economies makes competition inefficient.88
Historically, Canada’s electricity utilities were government-owned corporations and many were
vertically integrated given their operational and investment similarities.89 Vertical integration
often included generation, dating from earlier times when generation too was considered a
natural monopoly. 
Since the 1990s, the structure of the electricity sector has been shifting to varying degrees of
privatization, most notably in Ontario and Alberta. Policymakers in these two provinces
recognized that technological changes, such as small-scale electricity generation, meant that a
privatized electricity industry was both realistic and desirable because a market-driven
structure would produce more efficient pricing and better-informed consumption and
investment decisions.90
The introduction of privatization has been challenging, partly because the electricity sector has
unique elements which make reform and deregulation particularly complex. First, the whole
transmission grid can be affected by failing to balance supply with demand continuously, with
the potential for widespread service interruptions if this balance is not achieved. This was seen
in the August 2003 power blackout in the northeastern United States and Ontario. Second, both
supply and demand are very inelastic, so at peak demand times small changes in supply or
demand can result in very large price increases.91
Through the restructuring experiences of Ontario and Alberta, we will illustrate the advantages
and disadvantages of government ownership of electricity transmission and distribution versus
private sector ownership subject to regulation. Restructuring of the electricity sector has
presented major challenges due to its complexity, political risk-aversion, consumer reactions,
and unexpected external events. 
87 Laurence Booth and Paul Halpern, “Regulation of Transmission and Distribution Activities of Ontario Hydro,” in
Ronald J Daniels, ed, Ontario Hydro at the Millennium: Has Monopoly’s Moment Passed? (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press for University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 1996) 69. 
88 Ontario Energy Board, Resource Guide for Regulated Entities (Ottawa: OEB, 2009) at 4, online:
<http://www.oeb.gov.on.ca/OEB/_Documents/Documents/Resource%20Guide%20for%20Regulated%20Entities.pdf>.
89 Michael J Trebilcock and Roy Hrab, “What Will Keep the Lights on in Ontario: Responses to a Policy Short-
Circuit,” (2003) CD Howe Institute Commentary 191 at 1 [Lights on in Ontario]. 
90 Ibid at 2. 
91 Ibid. 
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2. ONTARIO’S RESTRUCTURING EXPERIENCE
The Hydro-Electric Commission of Ontario was created in 1906 by the Power Corporation Act
and was later renamed Ontario Hydro. This vertically integrated government-owned
corporation was responsible for all of the electricity generation and transmission needs of the
province. The Power Corporation Act required Ontario Hydro to provide “power at cost” and it
was not required to either pay taxes or generate profits.92 Rates were set by Ontario Hydro and
were reviewed, but could not be amended by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB), an
independent, self-financing Crown corporation. Power was then distributed by municipally
owned utility companies to consumers at a fixed price that bundled together generation,
transmission, and distribution costs.93 In the early 1990s, the Darlington nuclear station was
completed, at a cost far exceeding projections, leading to price increases of more than 30
percent in three years.94 Responding to consumer criticism, the Ontario government
implemented a price freeze in 1993, leaving prices below actual costs, a situation that
continued until restructuring in 2002.95
The perceived poor performance of Ontario Hydro and its high level of debt led to a
restructuring of Ontario’s electricity system under the 1998 Electricity Act. Ontario Hydro was
replaced by two provincially owned organizations. Hydro One was created to own and operate
the transmission grid while Ontario Power Generation (OPG) was formed to own and operate
the generation assets. In addition, local distribution companies (LDCs) were greatly reduced in
number (from about 300 to 90 after the restructuring).96 Hydro One acquired a significant
number of them and is now the largest LDC in Ontario, serving primarily rural areas of the
province; the remaining LDCs are owned by municipalities. Today, Hydro One Networks, Inc.,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hydro One owns and operates 97 percent of the transmission
assets in Ontario.97
The OEB, along with a newly formed Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO), a non-
profit corporate entity without share capital established by the Electricity Act, regulates the
electricity market. The OEB sets transmission and distribution rates, regulating the monopoly
parts of the industry as well as monitoring market-power abuses. The IESO operates the
wholesale hourly spot market and dispatch functions.98 The restructured industry also included
competition in electricity generation, and supply by LDCs to customers without a retail supplier.99
92 Merrill Dennison, The People’s Power: The History of Ontario Hydro (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960)
[Dennison]; Neil Freeman, The Politics of Power: Ontario Hydro and its Government 1906-1995 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1996).
93 Michael J Trebilcock and Roy Hrab, “Electricity Restructuring in Canada,” in Fereidoon P Sioshansi & Wolfgang
Pfaffenberger, eds, Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective (London: Elsevier Ltd, 2006) 419 at 423
[Electricity Restructuring]. 
94 Dennison, supra note 92. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Electricity Restructuring, supra note 93 at 423. 
97 Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, “Overview of Electricity Regulation in Canada,” (2008), online:
<http://www.blakes.com/english/legal_updates/reference_guides/Overview%20of%20Electricity%20in%20Canada.pdf
> [Blake, Cassels & Graydon].
98 Electricity Restructuring, supra note 93 at 424. 
99 Donald N Dewees, “Electricity Restructuring and Regulation in the Provinces: Ontario and Beyond,” (2005)
Presented to Energy, Sustainability and Integration the CCGES Transatlantic Energy Conference, Sept 2005 at York
University at 4, online: <http://repec.economics.utoronto.ca/files/tecipa-205-1.pdf> [Dewees].
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In May 2002, when the market had opened, Ontario unbundled electricity prices into separate
generation, transmission and distribution components. In addition, in order to finance the
stranded debt of Ontario Hydro (totalling about $20 billion), a stranded debt charge of 0.7
cents per kWh was added to the market price. The following summer was abnormally hot and
was accompanied by rapidly increasing electricity prices, due to high consumer consumption
as well as, more generally, a shortage of domestic generation capacity, an increasing reliance
on imports, and limited import capacity. The IESO issued power warnings and advisories for
consumers to conserve energy since power supplies were struggling to keep up with demand.100
Six months later, in response to consumer criticism arising from these higher prices, the
provincial government froze retail prices in December 2002 under the Electricity Pricing,
Conservation, and Supply Act, 2002. Retroactive to May 2002, it froze retail prices for low-
volume consumers, who accounted for half of the electricity consumed in the province.101
However, the price freeze had significant damaging effects as it reduced incentives for
consumers to conserve electricity, removed investor confidence in building much needed new
generation facilities, and made it more difficult to sell OPG facilities.102 The government also
exposed itself to significant financial commitments. The Minister of Energy had stated that the
price freeze would be revenue neutral, but this was not the case.103 
Overall, Ontario’s restructuring was disappointing. Originally designed to reduce the electricity
debt and encourage private sector investment in generation, it failed on both counts. The debt
grew further, requests to reduce usage had to be issued, and private investors demanded
consumer/taxpayer-backed contracts to build new electricity generation.104
There are a number of reasons for this failure. First of all, private investors were unsettled by
the constant delays and uncertainty surrounding the market opening. The market was originally
expected to open in November 2000, but this date was delayed first to May 2001 and then
further to May 2002 in order to ensure system reliability. In the meantime, investors lost
confidence due to the California electricity crisis and the Enron collapse over this period. The
Ontario market was then seen to be too risky for investment and new generation capacity
lagged for lack of sufficient capital when the market finally opened. Investor concerns also
related to OPG dominance and uncertainty surrounding the planned reduction of its market
share, and related to lack of LDC consolidation.105 These concerns were aggravated by the
uncertainty surrounding the proposed privatization of Hydro One. The Harris government
announced its plan in December 2001 to sell Hydro One through an initial public offering, one
year before market opening. However, this failed after two unions effectively argued in court
that the Electricity Act did not authorize the provincial government to sell its assets. Soon after,
the government announced that it would sell a minority stake, allowed under legislation.106
Before this could happen, a scandal (claims of excessive compensation packages being given
to senior executives) erupted in the summer of 2002, leading to the resignation of the board of
directors of Hydro One and the termination of its CEO. The concept of privatization was
abandoned in January 2003 when the government announced that it would retain 100 percent
ownership of Hydro One.107
100 Electricity Restructuring, supra note 93 at 424 - 425.
101Ibid at 426.
102Dewees, supra note 99 at 5. 
103 Lights on in Ontario, supra note 89 at 15.
104 Electricity Restructuring, supra note 93 at 440.
105 Ibid.
106 Iacobucci, Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 85 at 37.
107 Ibid.
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Other political difficulties also stood in the way of promoting an efficient electricity sector in
Ontario. It can be politically costly to promote efficiency if the move requires an increase in
prices. The price freeze prior to the restructuring had the effect of acclimatizing Ontario
consumers to low and stable prices, making consumers resistant to price increases. In order to
prevent costly policy reversals, it is important for restructuring initiatives to take into account
political realities. In this case, the government’s promise of lower electricity rates following
restructuring was unwise. 
The government may have faced less resistance had it publicized the actual benefits of the
restructuring such as debt reduction from the electricity industry and conservation/
environmental benefits. Even so, education alone would not have ended the political
difficulties since the restructuring would have had adverse effects on certain interest groups
who would have resisted the change despite the societal benefits.108 
The government could also have used other strategies to build investor confidence. For
example, it could have implemented policies that are difficult if not impossible to reverse by
privatizing government corporations or some of their assets to create political constituencies in
favour of the strategy.109 Or it could have demonstrated its commitment to the restructuring by
offering incentives to build new generation capacity, which would have protected private
investors from changes in the regulatory regime. These incentives would have reduced the cost
of private investment and would have reassured investors by reducing the political risk of
unstable prices due to too little capacity.110 In the UK, for example, the government paid
generating firms to maintain excess capacity to limit political backlash from price spikes or
blackouts. While the market itself should provide all the incentives needed for a successful
restructuring, the strategies mentioned above may be useful if there is significant political
opposition.111 
Given the failure of the restructuring to encourage investors to assume risk and the resultant
lack of long-term system development, the Ontario Power Authority was created pursuant to
the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004. This not-for-profit corporation acted to obtain new
generation by entering into long-term power purchase or contract-for-differences agreements.112
It has been responsible for over $27 billion in new generation investment since 2005.113
108 Ibid at 46.
109 Electricity Restructuring, supra note 93 at 441.
110 Iacobucci, Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 85 at 46. 
111 Ibid at 47.
112 Blake, Cassels & Graydon, supra note 97 at 18. For harsh criticisms of the implementation of these policies as they
relate to renewable energy, see Annual Report of the Ontario Auditor-General, 2011, chapter 3.
113 Ontario Power Authority, “2010 Annual Report” (2010) at 2, online:
<http://www.powerauthority.on.ca/sites/default/files/new_files/news_events/news_from_opa/pdfs/OPA%20Annual_R
eport%202010%20FINAL.pdf>.
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3. ALBERTA’S RESTRUCTURING EXPERIENCE
Before restructuring, Alberta’s electricity system was composed of three vertically integrated
utilities, two investor-owned and one owned by the city of Edmonton (EPCOR). The province
itself did not own electricity assets. Regulation was carried out by Alberta’s Energy Utility
Board (AEUB). Electricity was then purchased by the government at cost (which differed
between different generators) and was then resold to utilities’ distribution divisions at an
average uniform price.114 
Reform began in 1996 under the Electric Utilities Act (EUA) with the goals of attracting
private sector investment for generation to meet growing demand and fostering competition in
generation.115 The Power Pool of Alberta was created to provide a competitive, hourly spot
market for electricity. The Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) was also established
under the EUA to manage and operate the Power Pool.116
To facilitate competition in the wholesale market, the government mandated that the incumbent
utilities divest the production rights of their generation assets instead of outright divestiture.
Generation rights, called Power Purchase Arrangements (PPAs), were then auctioned to private
investors. However, the first auction left thousands of megawatts unsold, possibly because of
tacit agreements among the low number of bidders or lack of confidence in Alberta’s
commitment to restructuring. The second auction was more successful.117 While this method
did lead to new generation, the PPAs were an unsatisfactory substitute for facilities-based
competition so divestiture would have likely been more effective, although politically
difficult.118
New generation in Alberta was gas-fired and rising natural gas prices caused the wholesale
price of electricity to increase between 1996 and 1999. The province’s small import capacity
limited its ability to avoid a price shock. The Alberta Market Surveillance Administrator
conducted an investigation to look into the rising prices in 2000, finding some evidence of
capacity-withholding.119
To respond to the increased consumer prices, Alberta adopted a different strategy from Ontario.
In 2000, the government set a default regulated rate option system. This approach maintained
the incentives to conserve energy with a high marginal price for electricity, but lessened the
financial burden of the high price with a fixed monthly rebate.120 This seems to have been
preferable to Ontario’s inflexible uniform rate freeze.121
114 Electricity Restructuring, supra note 93 at 443.
115 Ibid
116 Blake, Cassels & Graydon, supra note 97 at 5. 
117 Electricity Restructuring, supra note 93 at 444. 
118 Ibid at 447.
119 Ibid at 445. 
120 Dewees, supra note 99 at 7.
121 Electricity Restructuring, supra note 93 at 447. 
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While private sector investment increased with restructuring, it has not completely displaced
public investment. The City of Calgary owns the vertically integrated ENMAX Power. It is the
largest retailer in Alberta and owns the distribution network in Calgary.122 In January 2004, the
AEUB, which, in 2008 became the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC), took over regulating
ENMAX Power from the City of Calgary.123 In Edmonton, EPCOR is also vertically integrated,
municipally owned, and regulated by the AUC.124 This mix of private and public entities
reflects the fact that Alberta’s restructuring emphasized regulation rather than ownership. The
AUC regulates the distribution system regardless of who owns it.  
Alberta has continued to support and refine its restructured market (although it has delayed full
retail price deregulation) and has consistently committed to a competitive generation sector. The
province has consequently experienced significant private sector investment in generation.125 
4. COMPARING ALBERTA AND ONTARIO
The different paths followed by the governments of Ontario and Alberta in restructuring the
electricity industry and then in responding to the resulting price shocks can likely be explained
by their respective pre-restructuring states. Ontario’s electricity system was mostly
government-owned, whereas Alberta’s system was mostly investor-owned and did not have the
same central government presence.126
B. Negative Externalities/Paternalism
Paternalistic concerns are sometimes related to negative externalities because people who
indulge in self-destructive behaviour often turn to government support systems funded by the
taxpayer. However, there are many areas where there are significant negative externalities
without paternalistic implications. Environmental degradation is one example. 
Historically, government has used Crown corporations to intervene in gambling and liquor
consumption on paternalistic and externalities grounds. Some provinces have set up Crown
corporations, like the Saskatchewan Gaming Commission, which owns and operates Casino
Regina and Casino Moose Jaw. Other provinces instead license and regulate private casinos. 
The sale of alcohol in Canada has customarily remained in government hands. Although
alcohol is produced in the private sector, its distribution is usually limited to provincial Crown
corporations. Alberta’s private sector model is an exception. Using the Liquor Control Board of
Ontario (LCBO) as an example and comparing its performance with that of Alberta’s private
sector distribution system, we explore the advantages and disadvantages of public ownership of
liquor distribution.
122 ENMAX Corporation, “How We Govern,” (2010) online: <http://www.enmax.com/NR/rdonlyres/ECF63DFC-
AD9E-42EA-BA6F-BBAD3E3C7CEF/0/About_ENMAX_How_We_Govern.pdf>.
123 ENMAX Corporation, “Alberta Electricity Industry and ENMAX: Regulation in Calgary,” online:
<http://www.enmax.com/Corporation/About+Enmax/Alberta+Electricity+Industry+and+ENMAX/Regulation+in+Cal
gary/Regulation+in+Calgary.htm>.
124 EPCOR, “The Transmission and Distribution System,” online: <http://www.epcor.ca/en-ca/about-
epcor/Regulatory/EnergyDeregulationInformation/Pages/DTSystem.aspx>.
125 Ibid
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1. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION
Government ownership of liquor sales through Crown corporations is often justified as an
effective way to address the problem of irresponsible consumption of liquor. This problem has
two dimensions: negative externalities and self-harm by vulnerable people. Externalities include
costs to the health-care and social welfare systems from health problems caused by excessive
drinking, fetal alcohol syndrome, drunk driving accidents, and alcohol related violence.127
People vulnerable to self-harm include those susceptible to alcohol dependence and minors.
Both of these dimensions could alternatively be addressed by high taxation and by prohibitions,
but with public ownership the government may have more comprehensive control. Given the
absence of a residual claimant that benefits from, for example, the sale of alcohol to minors, the
incentives of a publicly owned entity to sell irresponsibly may fall relative to private providers.
And with a tax-and-regulate approach, there would be incentives for private firms to evade the
taxes and circumvent the prohibitions in order to maximize profits. 
An additional advantage realized by the provincial government in owning liquor Crown
corporations is increased revenues through disguised taxation, via high, super-competitive
prices. These revenues are in addition to the explicit taxes on the sale of alcohol (federal excise
taxes and the harmonized sales tax). The government especially benefits from the implicit tax
system since most taxpayers are unaware of these taxes and are therefore less resistant to them.
Politicians prefer this route to avoid the political costs of visible taxation.128 
The public system leads to distortions in the price of alcohol. The Crown’s monopoly can lead
to super-competitive prices, with associated deadweight losses from lost surplus from
consumers priced out of the market. Another distortion is the subsidization of consumers in
remote locations by urban consumers. Although the cost of distribution is higher in remote
locations, the LCBO charges identical amounts throughout the province regardless of ease of
access to distribution centres, thus resulting in the effective subsidization of rural areas. Private
firms would not charge uniform prices throughout the province and thus this unjustified
distortion is unique to the Crown corporation structure.129
Another disadvantage of public ownership are higher costs due to the relative inefficiency of
government-owned enterprises. For example, Crown corporation employees tend to receive
much higher wages and benefits than comparable private sector employees.130 High costs are to
some extent reflected in reduced service rather than higher prices — that is, by the under-
allocation of resources to provide consumers with better service. For example, reduced service
can take the form of fewer outlets, fewer brands available (lowering inventory costs), and less
advertising. Overall the costs of inefficiencies are borne by consumers through higher prices,
transaction costs and loss of convenience.131
127 Thomas Babor et al, Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity: Research and Public Policy, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford
University Press and Pan American Health Organization, 2010). 
128 Bruce L Benson, David W Rasmussen & Paul R Zimmerman, “Implicit Taxes Collected by State Liquor
Monopolies,” (2003) 115:3/4 Public Choice 313 at 314. 
129 Nuri T Jazairi, “The Impact of Privatizing the Liquor Control Board of Ontario,” (Interim Report, York University,
1994) at 71.
130 Ibid at 315. 
131 Ibid.
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2. THE LCBO
The LCBO was established in 1927 pursuant to the Liquor Control Act (LCA) in Ontario,
which grants it wide powers creating an almost complete monopoly over the sale of alcohol,
other than beer. The LCA replaced the Ontario Temperance Act of 1916 (which prohibited the
sale of alcohol) and marked the end of the prohibition of liquor in Ontario. The LCBO was
developed at a time when the temperance movement was strong, and so it encouraged
moderation in alcohol consumption.132 The LCBO was then incorporated in 1975 as a Crown
corporation.133 Other retail outlets include The Beer Store (privately owned by two major
breweries: the Labatt arm of Anheuser-Busch InBev and Molson Coors Canada), small wine
stores selling only certain kinds of wine (e.g., wine produced by the owner’s vineyard), and
duty-free shops. Illegal brewing also occurs.134
In the mid-1990s, the Ontario Harris government expanded the LCBO’s capital allowance and
introduced reforms to revamp the quality of distribution, human resources, marketing, and
overall consumer experience.135 The Harris government was elected on a mandate that included
the privatization of the LCBO, but decided that the political gains from privatization would not
be worth the political costs, including opposition from various interest groups such as the
LCBO’s union and the Ontario public health community.136 Instead, the LCBO decided to
increase government revenues without selling more alcohol and were successful in increasing
the sale of higher-value products and targeting women consumers.137
3. PRIVATIZATION OF ALBERTA’S LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION
Alberta is the only province in Canada that has privatized liquor distribution and therefore can
be used to evaluate the comparative effects of private versus public ownership. The
privatization experience of Alberta highlights the trade-offs between a government-owned
Crown corporation system and a private sector regulated system. 
Originally, Alberta’s liquor distribution system was similar to that in Ontario. The Alberta
Liquor Control Board (ALCB) was set up in 1924 to regulate the distribution of alcohol other
than domestic beer, which remained in the private sector.138 The provinces’ systems diverged,
however, when Alberta began to slowly allow private involvement in the distribution of alcohol
and reduced the scope of the ALCB. Expected social and political problems did not manifest
themselves as predicted and in 1993 the ALCB was disbanded and was replaced by a
privatized liquor distribution system.139 The retail system is now fully privatized so that 
132 Dan Malleck, “The Bureaucratization of Moral Regulation: The LCBO and (not-so) Standard Hotel Licensing in
Niagara, 1927–1944,” (2005) 38:75 Social History 59.
133 Liquor Control Board of Ontario, “History of the LCBO,” online: LCBO
<http://www.lcbo.com/aboutlcbo/media_centre/history.shtml>.
134 Malcolm G Bird, “Alberta’s and Ontario’s Liquor Boards: Why Such Divergent Outcomes?” (2010) 53:4 Canadian
Public Administration 509 at 519 [Bird].
135 Ibid at 520.
136 Ibid at 514. 
137 Ibid at 515. 
138 Ibid at 518. 
139 Ibid at 521.
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licensed private stores can sell liquor. On the wholesale side, all alcohol (except domestic beer)
must be purchased through a highly regulated private firm monopoly, Connect Logistics.140
The government sets uniform wholesale prices by a formula including the supplier’s price, the
government’s mark-up, and federal government taxes. All retailers are charged the same
wholesale price and this cannot be negotiated to gain volume discounts. This has discouraged
the formation of retail liquor chain stores by negating their volume purchasing power. This was
intended to prevent supermarkets from obtaining too large a market share and gaining an
advantage over smaller retailers.141 Even so, retailers can obtain discounts from suppliers by
purchasing large volumes of products that are on a “limited time offer” sale by the supplier.142
The mark-up was also adapted to be a flat rate on the alcohol content rather than an ad valorem
amount. Overall, mark-ups were set at a level that would be revenue-neutral.143
4. REASONS FOR DIVERGENCE BETWEEN ONTARIO AND ALBERTA
The divergence in the two approaches is largely attributable to the reactions of interest groups
in each province. Ontario’s government-owned regime is highly favoured by politically
influential and well-financed suppliers, large brewers, wine storeowners, and unionized
workers. Suppliers benefit from a centralized system through reduced administrative,
marketing, labour, and transaction costs.144 Ontario winemakers receive preferential treatment
from the LCBO in the form of in-store promotions such as a high level of product selection, a
relatively large amount of shelf-space given their small market share, and annual
promotions.145 
In Alberta, on the other hand, political interest groups were not as powerful and the speed with
which the plan was implemented curtailed political opposition. Perhaps for these reasons,
suppliers of alcoholic beverages changed their business models instead of joining the
opposition.146 
5. EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION
Various studies of the effects of privatization have come to somewhat different conclusions,
perhaps because of changes over time. A study by Douglas West in 2003 described the effects
of Alberta’s decision to privatize retail liquor stores. The number of liquor stores greatly
increased, which also led to more communities being served by liquor stores. This implies
lower transaction costs and more convenience for consumers. Price trends differed among
140 Ibid at 513. 
141 Douglas West, “The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta,” (2003) Fraser Institute Digital Publication, online:
<http://www.lib.uwo.ca/files/business/booze2.pdf> [West].
142 Douglas West, “Double Marginalization and Privatization in Liquor Retailing,” (2000) 16 Review of Industrial
Organization 399 at 406. 
143 Bird, supra note 134 at 513. 
144 Ibid at 522.
145 Liquor Control Board of Ontario, Media Release, “LCBO support for Ontario wineries” (24 February 2010) online:
<http://www.lcbo.com/lcbo-ear/media_releases/content?content_id=1457>.
146 Bird, supra note 134 at 523.
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product classes, but on average, retail liquor prices fell by 2.9 percent for 90 of the 105
products in the sample.147 This difference in prices can largely be attributed to the falling
wholesale prices.148 Product selection from the warehouse increased overall, although averages
for Calgary and Edmonton were lower than before the privatization. Revenues increased for
the government after privatization and the province abandoned its revenue neutrality policy.
Wages for liquor store employees dropped significantly but employment itself increased as the
number of stores increased. The quantity of liquor products sold has modestly increased since
the privatization.149
Although the social impacts of privatization in Alberta are difficult to assess, trends suggest
some correlations. While West argues that evidence does not show that privatization has led to
an increase in social alcohol-related problems, Greg Flanagan disagrees. He found in 2003 that
Alberta had a higher absolute alcohol consumption rate compared to the rest of Canada and
that this consumption has been increasing since 1997.150 While overall there appears to be little
increase in crime rates, with Alberta’s rate falling below the national average, Flanagan finds
that violations of the Alberta Gaming and Liquor Act have risen substantially as the availability
of liquor increased.151 MacKenzie and Giesbrecht found that there has been an absolute
increase in break-and-enters and commercial robberies, which may be linked to extended
opening hours and poor security in small private stores.152 Given the strong links between
alcohol consumption and suicide, a study by Zalcman and Mann in 2007 found that suicide
rates among men and women increased significantly following Alberta’s privatization.153
While Trolldal in 2005 found that there was no significant impact on the number of drunk-
driving related deaths,154 many provincial and countrywide policy and educational programs
were put in place over the relevant time period, so that it is difficult to isolate the impacts from
the privatization.155 The difficulty in isolating privatization from other causes for change leaves
strong conclusions about the social impacts of Alberta’s approach to liquor distribution difficult
to draw. The economic impacts, however, seem clearly favourable.
147 West, supra note 141.
148 Bird, supra note 134 at 524.  
149 West, supra note 141 at 69.
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Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and Parkland Institute at 16.
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154 B Trolldal, “An Investigation of the Effects of Privatization of Retail Sales of Alcohol on Consumption and Traffic
Accidents in Alberta, Canada,” (2005) 100:5 Addiction 662. 
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C. Postal Service: Communitarianism/Distributive Justice
Government involvement in industries for communitarianism and distributive justice reasons
are widespread. Two salient examples are the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, which both are intended to
bolster Canadian identity through broadcasting and regulating Canadian content. Public
education also has a communitarian function, promoting citizenship qualities that private
educational entities may not do. Distributive justice is also one of the main goals of the
Toronto Housing Commission, which provides low-income tenants with affordable housing. To
illustrate the differences between government ownership and private ownership in upholding
communitarian and distributive justice goals, we will analyze Canada Post and its commitment
to providing universal service.156
Two features characterize Canada’s postal system: a government-owned monopoly on a
defined portion of the letter mail market, and a Universal Service Obligation (USO). The
monopoly provides Canada Post with a reserved market in which it is the only legal provider,
while the universal service obligation requires it to deliver letters ubiquitously and at a uniform
price across Canada. It is this consistent service and pricing across Canada that reflects the
communitarianism and distributive justice aspects of Canada Post’s mandate. 
There have been ongoing debates as to whether to reform Canada Post by privatizing or
deregulating it. We will look at the structure of its current regulatory regime and the objectives
it fulfils and then compare this to the experiences in other countries that have privatized or
deregulated their postal service. 
1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATORY REGIME
The Canada Post Corporation Act (CPC Act) was enacted in 1981 to respond to problems in
the Post Office Department at the time, including lack of resources, outmoded operations,
ineffective policy, rising deficits, labour unrest, and frequent postal strikes. With this Act, the
Post Office Department was turned into a corporation wholly owned by the federal government
called the Canada Post Corporation (Canada Post). It was also given a mandate to be
financially self-sufficient. The government believed that this would create a more effective
framework for managerial accountability, and that the corporation would have the ability to
bargain more effectively with employees. The CPC Act confers an exclusive statutory
monopoly on Canada Post for the collection, transmission, and delivery within Canada of
letters157 not weighing more than 500g. The monopoly is subject to a number of exemptions,
including delivery of magazines, books, and electronically or optically transmitted material,
and urgent letters subject to a fee at least equal to “three times the regular rate of postage
payable for delivery in Canada of similarly addressed letters weighing fifty grams.” While
Canada Post has a degree of corporate autonomy, government maintains substantial control.
Canada Post is overseen by a chairman and nine other directors who are named by the
responsible minister, and the president is appointed by the Governor in Council.
156 See Edward M. Iacobucci, Michael J. Trebilcock, and Tracey Epps, ““Rerouting the Mail: Why Canada Post is Due
for Reform,” (2007) 243 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary. 
157 Letters are defined in the Letter Definition Regulations (SOR/83-481) as “one or more messages or information in
any form, the total mass of which, if any, does not exceed 500 g, whether or not enclosed in an envelope, that is
intended for collection or for transmission or delivery to any addressee as one item.”
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Following the 1981 reform, Canada Post came under repeated pressure from the federal
government to eliminate its operating deficits. Struggling to meet its statutory objectives, in
1982 it reduced frequency of mail delivery in rural areas from six to five days and reduced
multiple deliveries to businesses to one delivery per day. It also converted selected post offices
to privately owned ones, franchised operations that offered retail postal services along with
other goods and services, and closed some post offices. After the election of a Progressive
Conservative government in 1984, Canada Post followed a more competitive agenda,
contracting out some non-core activities, offering clients incentives for pre-sorting their mail,
introducing user-pay pricing, and reducing cross-subsidization. Canada Post became a key
player in the Canadian courier market in 1993 when it purchased Purolator, a private sector
courier company. 
In 1995, the federal government commissioned a mandate review of Canada Post,158 which
resulted in the 1999 Framework Agreement, establishing a quasi-contractual relationship
between the government and Canada Post. The agreement set a five-year timetable to reach
stated financial goals and established a price-cap formula for first-class mail that allowed
Canada Post to increase the price of a stamp by a rate no more than two-thirds of the increase
in the consumer price index. The financial goals included profit targets and dividend
expectations, although the details were not made public. The agreement did not include any
type of customer charter or customer-service accountability, or details as to Canada Post’s
service obligations or expectations about performance targets. The government rejected the
report’s recommendation to appoint some sort of governance or regulatory supervisor to
evaluate and track Canada Post’s performance against specific targets.
2. SOCIAL OBJECTIVES OF CANADA POST
The primary social objective of Canada Post is to provide a universal service at common rates
across the country. This objective is consistent with other countries’ postal services.
Worldwide, national postal service operators have been subject to a USO, which typically
requires them to provide mail service at uniform rates to all regions of a country, often
accompanied by requirements relating to service frequency and quality. The rationale for a
universal service obligation historically, at least in North America, was to promote economic
development by reducing one of the costs of settling in remote or underdeveloped areas of the
country, and to promote national unity and cohesiveness by enhancing social
communication.159
Conventional wisdom in assigning a USO to postal operators is that an exclusively reserved
category of mail is required, so that routes where postal revenues exceed costs in densely
populated urban areas provide the resources to finance uniform service in less densely
populated or remote communities in the form of cross-subsidies. It is argued that without an
exclusive privilege, competitive entry would lead to cream-skimming on high-density routes,
leaving the national operator with money-losing routes and requiring ongoing government
bailouts or subsidies. 
158 George Radwanski, The Future of Canada Post Corporation – Report of the Canada Post Mandate Review (Ottawa:
Government of Canada, 2006). 
159 Robert M Campbell, The Politics of the Post: Canada’s Postal System from Public Service to Privatization
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1994) at 27 [Campbell]. 
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In addition, many parliamentarians defend Canada Post’s governmental ownership as it
represents the only federal government presence in many smaller communities,160 stimulating
regional economic development and providing stable employment. The Canadian flag
identifying the post office serves as an important symbol of Canadian national identity. Some
argue that this symbolic presence improves public respect for, and confidence in, the national
government.161
The early history of the postal system in Canada demonstrates both its economic and social
dimensions. The postal system was under the control of the British postmaster until 1851,
when the colonial governments took it over and subsequently greatly expanded it to reach new
areas of settlement. This played a significant role in building the nation and became a symbol
of the government’s positive role in the community.162 As an inexpensive means of
communication between rural and urban areas, benefits of the postal system included increased
literacy and improved educational systems. The expanded postal system also facilitated
economic development through increasing business opportunities, providing a network for
distributing retail goods and establishing commercial links with other countries.163
3. CHALLENGES FOR CANADA POST
Today, Canada Post faces new challenges that may require some type(s) of reform. First, the
introduction of electronic alternatives to the mail system is resulting in declining mail volumes,
causing a reduction in the profitability of the corporation. E-commerce is a growing industry as
it becomes more secure and less expensive for its users. Canada Post itself began an e-post
service (free bill presentment service) to respond to these changes, which may help it to reduce
its costs and increase its operational efficiency. In 2004 it acquired Webdoxs, which provides
online bill payment services.164
A second challenge is competition from private, globally integrated competitors outside
Canada Post’s statutory monopoly. They are particularly effective because of their
technological capabilities, brand-name recognition, and ability to take advantage of the size
and density of international markets. These companies merge and partner with courier services,
air cargo firms, logistics companies, and surface courier services to provide seamless service
from pick-up to final delivery.165
160 Philippe Le Goff, “Canada Post Corporation as a Provider of Financial and Government Services: The Way of the
Future?” (2005), Library of Parliament at 1, online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0514-e.htm> [Goff].
161 Katherine AH Graham Gene Swimmer, “The ‘Ottawa Syndrome:’ The Localization of Federal Public Servants in
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162 Campbell, supra note 159 at 31.
163 Ibid at 27 – 29.
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4. EVIDENCE FROM POSTAL REFORMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Other countries’ experiences in privatization or deregulation may serve as a useful guide for
Canada Post’s future. The evidence is consistent: liberalization improves performance.
Deregulating and privatizing postal operators has had a salutary effect on costs, and service has
generally improved. The ownership effect has been influential in countries that have followed a
privatization path, but the competition effect in countries that have deregulated has not always
been substantial. In some countries, there has not been much entry following the abolition of
statutory monopolies, perhaps because of remaining regulatory barriers to entry such as
excessive licensing requirements. However, even in countries where there has not been entry, it
is plausible that the threat of entry has exerted discipline on incumbent postal operators.
Despite potential positive benefits from liberalization, the challenge remains of adhering to the
USO. The USO could be accommodated in two ways: it could be relaxed; and cross-subsidies
could be replaced with direct targeted subsidies. 
It is not clear that a USO requires strictly uniform prices and services across regions. As with
other goods or services provided to remote or sparsely populated communities, one of the
burdens of residing in such communities (offsetting, in part, some of the benefits) is the
additional transportation and communication costs of providing goods and services over longer
distances. Similarly, it is reasonable to imagine a relatively uniform package of services
provided both to high-volume and low-volume routes, but priced differentially to reflect the
costs involved. Alternatively, service frequency and quality might vary across routes. In urban
areas, many postal services involve door-to-door delivery, while on rural routes service is
provided to roadside mailboxes or local post offices.
Second, even if for political or other reasons, uniform pricing and a uniform package of services
are deemed essential elements of a USO, many jurisdictions have forms of USOs that do not
entail cross-subsidization, but use targeted subsidies instead. Targeted subsidies are already
selectively provided in the Canadian postal sector to finance mailing privileges for
parliamentarians, the blind, Canadian newspapers and periodicals, and the shipment of
perishables to remote northern communities. Other jurisdictions provide direct and targeted
government subsidies to postal operators to maintain the requisite level of service and rates on
specific routes. The subsidies simply become an additional source of revenue to operators
servicing those routes, and are consistent with a level playing field for competition. Such
subsidies can be financed either out of general revenues or through a tax or required
contribution based on sales of all operators. A further refinement may be to put out losing routes
to competitive tender and award such routes for defined periods of time to either publicly or
privately owned postal operators that are prepared to operate these routes for the lowest subsidy.
A subsidy policy has the virtue of political transparency in that explicit, direct, and targeted
subsidies can be more effectively evaluated in the political process than implicit and untargeted
cross-subsidies buried in overall postal rates. In addition, it removes excuses for not achieving
financial performance targets owing to uneconomic social objectives being included in the
organization’s mandate. Finally, adopting an explicit and targeted subsidy strategy removes from
competitors the claim that competition by the national postal operator, outside the exclusive
sector, is an unfair form of competition sustained by cross-subsidies from revenues generated by
the legally protected monopoly. The strategy is thus likely to enhance competition in hitherto
protected and unprotected segments of the sector, to the benefit of all users of mail services. 
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The telecommunications sector in Canada has already adopted an analogous policy. Following
liberalization of that sector and the removal of legally imposed restrictions on competition, all
telecommunications service providers fund the USO through contributions. In high-cost areas,
where the cost of providing residential local telephone services exceeds sales revenue, the
CRTC has established a per-customer subsidy program to ensure service. The subsidy regime is
competitively neutral, in that it moves from one provider to another if a customer switches
providers. It is not obvious why a similar regime could not work in postal markets. 
D. Crown Financial Institutions: Positive Externalities/Information Asymmetries/Distributive
Justice
To meet the needs of small businesses in Canada, the government has created a number of
Crown financial institutions. We will focus on three of them: the Business Development Bank
of Canada; the Farm Credit Corporation of Canada; and the Export Development
Corporation.166 In particular, for each of these, we will explore the rationales for its
establishment, its mandate and its governance, and finally the tradeoffs between private sector
and government provision of its services. 
1. RATIONALES FOR ESTABLISHMENT
The Canadian government has committed itself to promoting small business growth and
improving the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in large part
because of a perception that small businesses create jobs. A 2008 study by Industry Canada
concluded that small businesses were responsible for approximately 80 percent of net job
creation between 1993 and 2003.167 Moreover, the study concluded that Canadian SME
exporters, accounting for only 5.5 percent of all firms, created a disproportionate number of
jobs at 47 percent between 1993 and 2002.168 The connection between small business and job
creation is, however, contested. Chen and Mintz suggest that while many small businesses are
created, they do not often grow and their positive impact on employment is empirically
unsubstantiated.169
Whatever the precise empirical connection between small businesses and job creation,
governments in Canada have taken the promotion of small business to be a policy goal. SMEs,
however, face many challenges, including acquiring and maintaining superior management
skills, skilled labour, marketing capacity, access to markets, and access to capital. Many SMEs
are financed through loans, and so these firms tend to be highly leveraged and vulnerable to
economic downturns.170
166 While the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation is another government-owned financial institution, it will not
be addressed in this paper since it performs a different function than those discussed here. 
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The main rationale for government involvement in small-business financing is that such loans
are small, are higher risk, are collateral-poor, or are based primarily on ideas. Small businesses
that require only small loans may not receive financing in the private sector, given the costs
associated with selecting, monitoring, and enforcing loans and investments. To compensate by
charging higher interest rates is problematic because borrowers at higher rates may behave in a
riskier manner (investing the loans in high-risk and negative net present value projects): the
borrower realizes the upside of the risky investment if it pays off, while the lender bears the
downside.171 Moreover, many financial institutions are unwilling to accommodate flexible
repayment schedules that many small businesses require given their small and uneven cash
flows at the start of operation.172 This concern is intensified if the small business is also
collateral-poor. 
For SMEs that depend highly on the ideas, skill, and motivation of the entrepreneur, the private
financial sector may face difficulties in charging lower interest rates due to their general
inability to accurately price the risk in these firms. Due to this type of information failure,
institutions may grant fewer loans than the risk would have justified.173
The role of the Crown corporation in this sector is not self-evident despite these difficulties
that the private sector faces. This is because governmental loans will be afflicted by the same
problems that plague private sector lenders; loans may not be cost-effective, for example,
whether provided by the state or the private sector. But the governmental objective of job
creation, whether understood as a kind of positive externality or as a distributive matter, may
invite intervention.  
2. CROWN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
a) The Business Development Bank of Canada
The Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) is a Crown corporation wholly owned by
the government. Originally a subsidiary of the Bank of Canada, it was created in 1944 under
the name Industrial Development Bank as a result of a wartime study by the Bank of Canada,
which raised concerns about the post-war economy.174 In 1975, it was renamed the Federal
Business Development Bank. The Business Development Bank of Canada Act was passed by
Parliament in 1995 after the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s left many members of
the small business community with financing problems.175
Today, the Business Development Bank of Canada Act sets out the BDC’s purpose, powers and
duties. For its mandate, section 4(1) states that “[t]he purpose of the Bank is to support Canadian
entrepreneurship by providing financial and management services and by issuing securities or
otherwise raising funds or capital in support of those services.” Section 4(2) states that “[i]n
carrying out its activities, the Bank must give particular consideration to the needs of small and 
171 Ibid at 9. 
172 Ibid at 11. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Michael Kirby and David Agnus, “Crown Financial Institutions,” (1996) The Standing Senate Committee on
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medium-sized enterprises.”176 The control and accountability of the BDC is set out in the FAA
under Part X and the corporation is listed under Schedule III, Part 1. The BDC is governed by
an independent board of directors whose members are appointed by the Minister of Industry.177
In addition to providing term loans, the BDC has developed three financing programs to cater
to SMEs: Co-vision to support start-ups and small businesses with financing up to $100,000;
Productivity Plus which supports productivity improvements in SMEs; and Innovation which
provides working capital solutions to support growth projects for SMEs. The BDC also
provides consulting services and subordinated financing and venture capital.178 In the 2010
fiscal year, the BDC had a consolidated net income of $6.1 million (down from the $90.6
million in the 2009 fiscal year). However, the venture capital, consulting, and securitization
business lines all recorded net losses.179 The BDC had 29,000 clients, including entrepreneur
exporters whose exports totalled $21 billion, and entrepreneurs, who sustained 511,000 jobs.180 
One point of contention relates to competition with the private sector. Theoretically the BDC
complements, but does not directly compete with, private financial institutions. While its
predecessors were lenders of last resort and thus did not compete with the private sector, the
BDC is not a lender of last resort, leading private sector firms to be sceptical of the claim that
they are not in competition.181
b) The Farm Credit Corporation of Canada
The Farm Credit Corporation (FCC), originally named the Canadian Farm Loan Board (CFLB),
began operating in 1929. Unlike the other two Crown financial institutions, it was created as a
result of political pressure from an organized group of farmers that demanded financial assistance
for agriculture.182 Other factors also led to the formation of the CFLB. First, the decreased
demand for Canadian wheat and subsequent decline in agricultural prices in the 1920s threatened
the viability of Canadian agriculture. Second, a 1923 report had demonstrated that Canadian
farmers paid more for long-term credit than farmers in other countries as well as non-farmers in
Canada, due to a perceived deficiency in private sector lending competition.183
In 1959, the Farm Credit Act replaced the CFLB with the FCC and gave the FCC broader
powers in order to respond to the criticisms of the older corporation, including its conservative
policies. This legislation was replaced in 1992 when the Farm Credit Corporation Act was
enacted, again substantially expanding the scope and powers of the FCC, in order to better
reflect farming conditions in the 1990s.184
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Currently, the FCC’s mandate, as set out in the Farm Credit Corporation Act, is “providing
specialized and personalized business and financial services and products to farming
operations, including family farms, and to those businesses in rural Canada, including small
and medium-sized businesses, that are businesses related to farming.”185 It is financially self-
sufficient and provides its services to more than 90,000 primary producers, value-added
operators, suppliers and processors. A board of directors is responsible for the governance of
the FCC and its members are appointed by the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food and
Minister for the Canadian Wheat Board, with approval of the Governor in Council. The FCC is
also subject to Part X of the FAA and is listed under Schedule III, Part 1.186
Services provided by the FCC include primary production financing, agribusiness and agri-
food financing, financing for equipment, crop input and livestock at the point of sale, insurance
provision, and venture capital financing.187 In 2010, the FCC had 114,439 loans, 41,418 of
which were new for that year, with an average loan of $159,003. The FCC continues to
generate a positive net income ($281.9 million for 2010).188 
c) The Export Development Corporation
The Export Development Corporation (EDC) is also a wholly owned Crown corporation that
was established in 1944 to assist with post-war economic reconstruction. Originally under the
name Export Credits Insurance Corporation (ECIC), it was created to fill gaps in Canadian
export capabilities and markets that were caused by the war. There was a concern that Canada
would experience a decline in exports for goods that were related to the war, and that exporters
would be unable to obtain credit facilities from private financial institutions given the risks
involved.189
Another gap the corporation was intended to close was the credit problem faced by those
importing Canadian goods. Foreign importers, as a result of the war, could not finance the
purchase of needed goods from their own domestic financial institutions, so the ECIC gave
loans and financial assistance to foreign governments,190 including Belgium, Norway, the
USSR, and the Czechoslovak Republic.191
In 1969, the policies of the ECIC were criticized for being too conservative. This led to the
creation of the EDC under the Export Development Act, which greatly expanded its mandate.
The corporation’s legislation was amended again in 1993 to further expand its formal role.192
185 Farm Credit Canada, “Corporate Plan Summary 2010-11 to 2014-15,” (2010) at 1, online: <http://www.fcc-
fac.ca/en/AboutUs/Profile/pdf/cps_2010_11_e.pdf>.
186 Ibid at 11. 
187 Farm Credit Canada, “Products and Services,” online: <http://www.fcc-fac.ca/en/index.asp>.
188 Farm Credit Canada, “Annual Report 2009-10,” (2010) at 3, online: <http://www.fcc-
fac.ca/en/AboutUs/Profile/pdf/AR2009-10_LO_e.pdf>.
189 Kirby & Agnus, supra note 174.
190 Ibid.
191 Department of Finance, Public Accounts of Canada, 1948 (Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1948) at F52. 
192 Kirby & Agnus, supra note 174.
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Under the Export Development Act, the EDC’s mandate is “to grow and develop Canada’s
trade, and the capacity of Canadian companies to participate in and respond to international
business opportunities.”193 The Act also exempts the EDC from federal taxes.194 The EDC is
financially self-sustaining and provides Canadian companies with trade finance and risk
mitigation services, which allow them to compete internationally.195 Its control and
accountability is set out in Part X of the FAA and it is listed under Schedule III, Part 1. An
independent Board of Directors comprised of 15 members appointed by the Minister of
International Trade governs the corporation.196 In March 2009, the government increased the
mandate of EDC in order to inject the financial system with credit to help struggling, trade-
related Canadian companies, especially those in the hardest-hit sectors due to the recent
economic downturn.197  
Today, the EDC provides services such as insurance mechanisms,198 financing for both
Canadian and foreign companies, and bonding mechanisms. Support schemes provided by the
EDC, such as loans to promote export business or foreign direct investment, are individualized
to the needs of companies to expand their investor base and improve their capital structures.
The EDC also provides private equity and venture capital through direct investment in
domestic and foreign companies. It also collaborates with venture capital funds which invest in
Canadian companies to promote export growth.199 In 2009, the EDC had a net income of $258
million and no annual appropriations from Parliament.200 It serves 8,469 clients and supports
businesses in 200 markets.201
3. PRIVATIZATION POSSIBILITIES
The question remains whether government ownership is the best form of involvement to
achieve the governmental objectives described above. 
193 Export Development Corporation, “Mandate and Role,” online: <http://www.edc.ca/english/corporate_mandate.htm>
[EDC Mandate].
194 Maciej Kotowski, “Insuring Canada’s Exports: The Case for Reform at Export Development Canada,” (2007) CD
Howe Institute Commentary 257 at 6 [Kotowski]. 
195 EDC Mandate, supra note 193. 
196 Ibid.
197 Kirby & Agnus, supra note 174.
198 Insurance solutions include: accounts receivable insurance, which covers receivables resulting from commercial or
political risks; single buyer insurance, which covers unlimited sales to one customer for 180 days; contract
frustration insurance, which covers losses for one export contract; political risk insurance, which protects overseas
assets such as equipment and manufacturing facilities; and performance security insurance, which covers losses if a
customer demands payment of a bond issued by the client’s bank without valid reason.
199 Gunseli Baygan-Robinett, “The Canadian Risk Capital Market and the Role of Government Policies,” (2007)
International Consortium of Entrepreneurship at 33, online:
<http://ice.foranet.dk/upload/canada_%28nov_2007%29.pdf>.
200 Export Development Corporation, “Annual Report 2009,” (2009), online:
<http://www.edc.ca/publications/2010/2009annualreport/english/1.htm>.
201 Ibid. 
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The rationale for originally creating the BDC to fill the credit gaps for SMEs may be less of a
concern today than at time of formation. Private sector institutions have since been using
innovative financing techniques and setting up flexible repayment options to better serve the
SME sector.202 Some argue that the presence of the government-owned institution actually
weakens market incentives for the private sector to adapt their services to SMEs. As
information technology improvements continue, the information problems associated with
pricing risk in new, idea-based markets are being reduced.203
Similarly, for the EDC, some critics have recommended a partial privatization with a tax
scheme to maintain the same extent of coverage while shifting away from government
provision of short-term insurance. At present, the EDC has a dominant market share in both
short-term and medium-term credit insurance markets and it competes directly with private
insurers, crowding out private firms’ entry into the market.204 Many other governments have
moved towards a private sector model, retaining only extreme and speculative risks within the
government sphere. For example, in Europe, 95 percent of export credit insurance is provided
by private institutions, and some countries have privatized large areas of their once
government-owned institutions.205 During the 1990s, the private sector expanded to provide
credit insurance, partially due to transformations in the market including innovations in
information technology, regulatory harmonization in Europe, and financial market innovation
in delivery methods for credit insurance.206 The federal government would also gain from the
partial privatization from increased tax revenue by taxing premium income and firm profits,
neither of which are received from the EDC. 
Reducing criticism from Canada’s trading partners would be another benefit of partial
privatization of the EDC. The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) bans export subsidies in general.207 The WTO rules indicate that the
operations of export credit agencies should break even in the medium to long term (although
subsidies are permitted as long as this constraint is met).208 While the EDC is financially self-
sustaining and meets the requirements of the WTO, the EDC differs from other OECD
countries export credit agencies in that it both enjoys a dominant market share and competes
directly with private insurers.209
While short-term insurance could be regulated and provided by the private sector, medium- and
long-term insurance are more complicated to delegate. While several private insurers including
AIG, Zurich, FCIA, and Hiscox have begun offering these policies, there are many challenges
in this market because of the variable nature of the risks, the length of coverage, and the large
transaction sizes.210
202 Schnurr, supra note 170 at 47. 
203 Ibid
204 Kotowski, supra note 194 at 1.
205 Jian-Ye Wang et al, “Officially Supported Export Credits in a Changing World,” (2005) International Monetary Fund. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Karen H Cross, “King Cotton, Developing Countries and the ‘Peace Clause’: the WTO’s US Cotton Subsidies
Decision,” (2006) 9:1 Journal of International Economic Law 149. 
208 Kotowski, supra note 194 at 6.
209 Ibid at 1.
210 Ibid at 17.
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Political considerations may also be a factor in the government’s decision to remain involved.
Reforming the EDC may be accompanied by strong political opposition from EDC employees
and those exporting companies who have developed a strong relationship with the EDC.211
V. REFORM PROPOSALS
The key policy decision with respect to Crown corporations is whether to privatize them or
not. In Canada over the past 25 years, the following major privatizations have taken place:
Teleglobe in 1987; Air Canada from 1988-1989, the Canadian National Railway Company in
1995; Petro-Canada in the 1990s; Nova Scotia Power Corp. in 1992; Manitoba Telephone
System in 1996; and Ontario’s Highway 407 in 1999.212 Privatization occurs frequently when
either the rationale for government involvement no longer exists (for example technology has
improved and altered a market’s structure so that it is no longer a natural monopoly) or when
privatization (albeit subject to regulation, taxation, or subsidization) has been identified as
better fulfilling the government’s policy objectives. 
In our view, there are many sectors where further privatization would be appropriate. This is
because the rationale that may have once existed for public ownership no longer exists, or as is
often true, there never was a good rationale for public ownership. While in many cases public
ownership may facilitate pursuit of a particular policy goal, such goals can frequently be
achieved under a privatized regime through some alternative means of government
intervention. That is, privatization can realize both the economic gains that private ownership
tends to promote, as well as the social objective that more limited government intervention
may promote. Of course, in some cases it may be that public ownership is indispensable to
realizing certain social goals, but too often the social goal is invoked to justify public
intervention without adequate recognition of alternative policy instruments that could also
accomplish these goals in a privatized regime. Genuine policy debates about privatization,
including alternative means of ensuring the realization of social goals, are often swept aside by
interest group politics, with groups such as unions strongly opposed to privatization of any sort
for reasons that have much more to do with their anticipated well-being post-privatization than
the public interest.
An example of the policy wisdom of privatization and the political challenges that confront it
is found in the postal service.213 We believe there is a strong case for privatizing Canada
Post.214 The economic case is clear: there are no apparent market failures in mail delivery that
211 Ibid at 22. 
212 Hrab, supra note 63 at 4. 
213 See Iacobucci et al., supra note 156.
214 Ibid.
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invite state ownership, and comparative experience with privatizing the mail system suggests
significant potential for service and cost improvements. On the other hand, social concerns
about universal service are invoked to oppose privatization, as is the fact that the Post Office is
profitable and thus contributes to the fisc.215 But neither of these objections to privatization
withstands scrutiny. If universal service is taken to be valuable from a social perspective, it can
be achieved without public ownership. Telecommunications provides a suitable example of
private owners being compelled to contribute financially to universal service. And on fiscal
matters, it is not at all obvious that super-competitive profits, which Canada Post should earn
given its legal protections from competition, are an efficient form of taxation.
In many cases, the arguments in favour of public ownership, including the arguments in favour
of retaining Canada Post as a Crown corporation, are made by those who have a clear political
agenda. Perhaps most prominently, public unions such as the Canadian Union of Postal
Workers actively have campaigned against privatization and may have incentives to invoke
such arguments whether they are valid or not. Governments themselves may also prefer the
hidden nature of taxation and subsidization that public ownership implicitly entails. 
There is no simple answer to managing the politics of privatization, but there are some clear
lessons. It is important when government is considering privatizing a Crown corporation to
articulate clearly whether the policy objectives that led to its creation have changed, or whether
the domestic or comparative experience suggests a superior policy instrument for achieving
these objectives, so that the decision to privatize can be subjected to informed public scrutiny.
One concern with privatization occurs when the government fails to commit to the nature and
scope of future government intervention in the industry and the regulatory, tax, and subsidy
policies that are to be put in place. This information will affect the value of the corporations
and governments can easily overstate the gains from privatization, thus creating backlash and
opposition to further privatization of a particular sector, or in other sectors. 
To conclude, it is worth emphasizing that there is a range of normative objectives that public
ownership might help advance, and in some contexts, public ownership is the most appropriate
policy instrument to accomplish certain goals. But in many cases, focused government
intervention in a privatized market will accomplish the same goals as public ownership, but at
a much lower cost.
215 See, e.g., Canadian Union of Postal Workers, “Postal Privatization: Questions and Answers,” November 2010,
http://www.publicpostoffice.ca/index.cfm/ci_id/12604/la_id/1.htm: “Governments arguably lose a great deal by
privatizing. They lose regular payments to national coffers if post offices are profitable (as opposed to receiving one-
time profits from privatizing). They also risk being politically unpopular with the public, especially people living in
rural areas. Rural residents stand to lose affordable service, or service altogether, in a privatized postal system geared
to profit.”
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